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DEDUCTION FOR HOME OFFICE USED BY
CLIENTS: FR,4NKEL V. COMMISSIONER
HE Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in
Mr. and Mrs. Frankel's income tax returns for 1977 and 1978 aris-
ing from deductions for their home office. Mr. Frankel, editorial
page editor of The New York Times, performed substantial work in the
home office and accepted frequent telephone calls there from various pub-
lic figures who had important information or whose views he believed he
should hear.' The Commissioner did not contest that Mr. Frankel used
the home office exclusively and on a regular basis for business purposes.
The Tax Court found that since Mr. Frankel would need to remain at the
Times offices almost twenty-four hours a day to complete his work and be
available for the phone calls received in the home office, his use of the
home office was for the convenience of his employer. 2 Moreover, the pub-
lic figures who called him in the home office qualified as clients or custom-
ers of the Times.3 Nevertheless, no deduction was allowed for 1977 or
1978 based on Mr. Frankel's use of the home office, because all the re-
quirements of I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B) were not met. Held In order to sup-
port a deduction under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B), a home office must be
physically used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing
with the taxpayer; telephonic contacts are insufficient. Frankel v. Commis-
sioner, 82 T.C. 318 (1984).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 280A
In 1976 Congress added section 280A4 to the Internal Revenue Code
with the goal of establishing definitive rules limiting the deductibility of
home office expenses. 5 Sections 162, 212, and 262 previously governed
I. Mr. Frankel had a special, unlisted telephone line at home, paid for by the Times,
which he used for calls from political officials and public figures. Many of these individuals
represented important constituencies of the Times's readers. They called Mr. Frankel at
home because they believed that he would be a more receptive listener there or because
either he or they were busy during the day. In addition, Frankel used the telephone to
consult with other Times employees during evening hours regarding changes in the late edi-
tion of the Times, which was printed at approximately 11:30 p.m. Mr. Frankel also used the
home office in the morning to read the newspaper, clip items from it, and write memoranda
for following editorials or other work. Mr. Frankel also used the home office on weekends
for work on weekend editions of the Times.
2. Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 318, 325 (1984).
3. Id.
4. I.R.C. § 280A was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601,
90 Stat. 1569.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 157, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3051, and in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 695, 849; S. REP. No. 938, 94th
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these deductions, which were allowed only for ordinary and necessary
business expenses.6 In their application to home office expenses, these sec-
tions were given conflicting interpretations by the Tax Court and the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue. The Tax Court derived its standard for
applying these sections to home office expenses from the Supreme Court's
definition of "necessary" as "appropriate and helpful."'7 Under this rubric
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 144, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3576, and in
1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 182; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 136 (Comm. Print 1976),
reprintedin 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 148. These documents give substantially similar accounts
of the concerns prompting the enactment of § 280A. The House, Senate, and Joint Commit-
tee reports cite a number of cases exemplifying the lenient Tax Court standards for home
office deductions: Hall v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 612 (D.N.H. 1975); Gill v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 10 (1975); Anderson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 234
(1974); Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304 (1973); Newi v. Commis-
sioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969), aft'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970). The legislative
history of § 280A indicates that a need existed for "definitive rules" to resolve the conflict
between the Tax Court and the IRS, to relieve the administrative burden on the IRS en-
tailed by application of the subjective "appropriate and helpful" standard propounded by
the Tax Court, and to preclude deductions when expenses were properly attributable to
personal use and only minor incremental expenses had been incurred in order to accommo-
date business activities. One of few notable differences between the House and Senate re-
ports is that the Senate's proposed amendments included a provision allowing deduction of
ome office expenses for an employee if his employer provided no work space for him. See
SEN. REP. No. 938, supra; cf. Note, The Deduction of Home Office Expenses Under Section
280.4: Personal Convenience vs. Business Necessity, 36 TAX LAW. 1199, 1199-224 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Note, The Deduction of Home Office Expenses] (proposing new criteria for
home office deductions, including "business necessity" such that "[n]o home office should be
considered necessary if the taxpayer already has an office at his place of employment." Id.
at 1215); see also Kulsrud, Recent Statutory and Judicial Developments Have Liberalized
Home-Office Deductions, 56 J. TAX'N 344 (1982) (current status of home office deduction,
with discussion of requirements); Pearle, Practitioner's Guide to Home-Office Deductions
Under Tough TRA 1976 Rules, 46 J. TAX'N 238 (1977) (brief discussion of 1976 § 280A
requirements); Ward, Home Office Deductions. The Development and Current Status of Sec-
tion 280A(c)(1), 13 CUM. L. REV. 195 (1982) (development of home office deduction, with
attention to recent changes); Note, Home Office Deductions, Curphey v. Commissioner, 60
NEB. L. REV. 619 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Home Office Deductions] (detailed his-
tory of home office deduction).
6. I.R.C. § 163 (1982) reads: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred ...in carrying on any trade or business ...."
(Emphasis added.) The ordinary and necessary requirement also controls id. § 212 (deduc-
tion of expenses incurred for production of income or for maintenance or management of
property held for the production of income) and id § 262 (no deduction allowed for per-
sonal, living, or family expenses).
7. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). The taxpayer in Welch attempted to
rehabilitate the credit of his involuntarily bankrupt employer by repaying the debts of the
company so far as he was able, and to that end he paid substantial amounts during a five-
year period. The taxpayer sought to deduct the payments as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses under the predecessor to current § 162. The Supreme Court disallowed the
deductions. 290 U.S. at 115. Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo stated, "[w]e may as-
sume that the payments to creditors of the Welch Company were necessary for the develop-
ment of the petitioner's business, at least in the sense that they were appropriate and
helpful." 1d. at 113. The Court did not consider the payments to be "ordinary," but rather
"in a high degree extraordinary." Id. at 114. Although the Court's definition of "necessary"
as "appropriate and helpful" was only a dictum, it was relied on by the Second Circuit the
following year in Blackmer v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1934) (deduction
allowed to actor for amounts spent for entertainment and publicity as an ordinary and nec-
essary business expense). Welch was cited for the "appropriate and helpful" test by the
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the Tax Court allowed deductions even when the taxpayer's employer pro-
vided him with adequate work space and did not require or request that he
do work at home.8 The Commissioner, however, argued for a stricter stan-
dard, requiring the taxpayer to show that he had to provide his own work
space as a condition of his employment. 9
Congress resolved this conflict between the Tax Court's and the Com-
missioner's application of sections 162 and 212 by enacting section 280A,
which provides an even more austere standard than that proposed by the
Commissioner. As advocated by the Commissioner, section 280A would
require regular use of the home office for business activities, and if the
taxpayer is an employee, the use must be for the convenience of his em-
ployer. Section 280A, however, further restricts home office deductions by
requiring exclusive use of the home office for trade or business purposes' 0
dissent in Davis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 175, 185 (1962), and was regularly relied on by
the Tax Court thereafter. See, e.g., Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820, 825 (1973), rev'd,
509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M.
(CCH) 686 (1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Bischoffv. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M.
(CCH) 538, 539 (1966).
8. See Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820, 826 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 315 (1973); Bischoffv.
Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 538, 539 (1966).
9. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52. The positions of the Tax Court and the Commis-
sioner varied more than this brief summary suggests. See Note, Home Office Deductions,
supra note 5. In 1962 the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 62-180, which
stated that the taxpayer must be required to provide his own office space as a condition of
his employment and that his use of the home office must be regular. In Peiss v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 78 (1963), the Commissioner contended that the home office must be used
exclusively for business purposes; the Tax Court, however, disagreed. Id at 84. In Bischoff
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 538 (1966), the Tax Court stated that it was not neces-
sary that the home office be required as a condition of the taxpayer's employment for the
deduction to be allowed and returned to the Welch "appropriate and helpful" test for "nec-
essary." See supra note 7. In O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, 843
(1972), the Tax Court disallowed the deduction because the use of the home office was
purely for personal convenience, but the court continued to disregard Revenue Ruling 62-
180. In Anderson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 234, 237-38 (1974), the Tax Court
allowed a deduction based on the taxpayer's use of a family room for managing his invest-
ments. The Tax Court retreated in Meehan v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 794, 808 (1976), using
an analysis similar to that in Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973), that no
deduction is allowable if the taxpayer did not incur any additional expense because of the
business use. In Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 524 (1976), the Tax Court held that
§ 162 was limited by § 262; therefore, the "appropriate and helpful" test was not applicable
when the use was mixed between personal and business.
10. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 775 (1980) (in order to amount to a
"trade or business," the activity must be "sufficiently systematic and continuous"). In
Curphey the taxpayer, a dermatologist, was employed full-time at a hospital and maintained
a home office, which he used exclusively in managing six rental units that he owned. The
Tax Court held that management of rental property may amount to a trade or business and
that if a taxpayer has more than one trade or business; he may be entitled to a "principal
place of business" for each. Id. The Commissioner conceded that if the taxpayer's rental
activities amounted to a trade or business, the home office would be its principal place of
business. Id. at 776 n. 11. But cf. Cristo v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057, 1066
(1982), in which the Commissioner did not concede that the home office would be the princi-
pal place of business for the taxpayers' rental activities, and the Tax Court disallowed the
deduction on the ground that the rental property itself was the principal place of business,
even though it contained no space for an office. Congress amended § 280A(c)(I)(A) to af-
firm the Tax Court's holding in Curphey that a taxpayer may have a principal place of
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and by limiting the amount of any deduction to the excess of gross income
derived from use of the home office over the allocable deductions allowa-
ble without regard to business use, such as interest and taxes."l The tax-
payer must satisfy one of three requirements to receive the deduction. The
home office must be: (1) the taxpayer's principal place of business;
(2) used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the
taxpayer; or (3) housed in a separate structure unattached to the taxpayer's
residence. 12 These three provisions represent an attempt by Congress to
tie deductibility of home office expenses to objectively verifiable circum-
stances, in contrast to the overly subjective assessment called for by the
Tax Court's "appropriate and helpful" test. 13
The Tax Court rigorously applied the "definitive" new rules of section
business for each business. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119,
§ 113(c), 95 Stat. 1635, 1641-42. See Ward, supra note 5, at 207. Prior to the amendment,
§ 280A(c)(I)(A) read "(A) as the taxpayer's principal place of business." The heading of the
section of the Act amending § 280A reads "Principal Place of Business Applies to Any
Trade or Business."
il. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5) (1982).
12. I.R.C. § 280A(c) (1982) provides:
(c) ExCEPTIONS FOR CERTAIN BUSINESS OR RENTAL USE; LIMITATION ON
DEDUCTIONS FOR SUCH USE.
(1) CERTAIN BUSINESS USE.-Subsection (a) [generally prohibiting de-
ductions with respect to home offices] shall not apply to any item to the
extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclu-
sively used on a regular basis-
(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or business of the
taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or cus-
tomers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of
his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the
dwelling unit ....
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the
exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of
his employer.
(5) LIMITATIONS ON DEDUCTIONS.-In the case of a use described in
paragraph (1). . . the deductions allow;ed under this chapter for the taxable
year by reason of being attributed to such use shall not exceed the excess
of-
(A) the gross income derived from such use for the taxable year, over
(B) the deductions allocable to such use which are allowable under
this chapter for the taxable year whether or not such unit (or portion
thereof) was so used.
Under § 280A no deduction is allowed based on investment activities unless these amount to
a trade or business of the taxpayer. See supra note 10. Expenses claimed under § 280A must
still satisfy the requirements of §§ 162 and 262. See supra note 6.
13. Frankel, 82 T.C. at 333 (Dawson, C.J., dissenting); id at 442 (Wilbur,J., dissenting).
Subsequent to the reversal of its decision in Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679, 681 (4th
Cir. 1975), rev'g 60 T.C. 820 (1973) (home office not for convenience of employer when
employer provided office available evenings and weekends), the Tax Court seemed prepared
to follow a stricter treatment of home office deductions. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 515, 524 (1976), afdper curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979) ("[tlhe 'appropriate and helpful' concept is not a litmus test"). The enactment of
§ 280A, however, preempted further refinement of the "ordinary and necessary" analysis
previously used.
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280A, but considerable litigation of home office issues continued, centering
on the provisions of sections 280A(c)(l)(A), the principal place of business
requirement, and 280A(c)(I)(B), the requirement that the home office be
used by clients in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer. In Bale v. Com-
missioner14 the Tax Court originated the "focal point" test for determining
a taxpayer's principal place of business. In Bale and other cases the court
tended to define the focal point of a taxpayer's trade or business as the
place from which the taxpayer distributed the goods or services that pro-
duced his income.' 5  For example, in Moretti v. Commissioner16 the Tax
Court allowed a deduction based on the operation of a freelance envelope
stuffing business from the taxpayers' home.' 7
An important case defining the limitations of home office deductions,
Drucker v. Commissioner, 8 involved a concert musician employed by the
Metropolitan Opera. The Opera did not provide its musicians with space
for individual practice; indeed, it expected them to practice off the prem-
ises. The taxpayer spent more time working in a practice studio in his
home than in all of the other places combined where he worked for the
Opera. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's trade or business was not
that of a concert musician but rather that of an employee of the Opera; the
Opera was the focal point of his activities and thus his principal place of
business. 19 The deduction for his studio was disallowed.2 0 The Second
14. 74 T.C. 103 (1980). In Bale the taxpayer used portions of her residence for office
work and for food preparation for her hot dog stand, the "Gay Dog," because the stand
itself was too small to accommodate those activities. The Tax Court concluded "that what
Congress had in mind was the focal point of the taxpayer's activities, which, in the case
before us, would be the Gay Dog itself," because it was her sales at the stand that generated
her income. Id. at 109.
15. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696, 700 (1981) (court not convinced
real estate salesperson's principal place of business not broker's office); Anderson v. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305, 1309 (1982) (anesthetist's services generated income;
therefore, focal point was hospitals where services rendered); Cristo v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 1057, 1065 (1982) (apartment house was focal point of taxpayer's rental ac-
tivity); Strasser v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1125, 1127 (1981) (focal point was
school even though teacher worked more time in home office); Weightman v. Commissioner,
42 T.C.M. (CCH) 104, 108-09 (1981) (focal point of professor's employment was university);
Chauls v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 234, 236 (1980) (teaching classes generated in-
come; therefore, focal point was school); Kastin v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1071
(1980) (deduction denied high school athletics coach even though the school provided him
no office space, on the ground that the school was his principal place of business); Proposed
Regs., 45 Fed. Reg. 52399, § 1.280A-2(b) (1980), and 48 Fed. Reg. 33320, § 1.280A-2(b)
(1983). But see Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 605
(1982), discussed infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
16. 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1200 (1982).
17. Id. at 1203.
18. 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
19. 79 T.C. at 612. The Tax Court cited Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970),
as authority for its finding that inquiry into whether the taxpayer was in the trade or busi-
ness of being an employee is relevant to determining his principal place of business. In
Primuth the Tax Court allowed a deduction for fees paid by the taxpayer to an employment
service for advice, resume preparation, and mailing of brochures and letters in order to
obtain a new position, on the ground that the taxpayer was in the trade or business of being
a corporate executive. In his dissent in Drucker, however, Judge Korner pointed out that the
thrust of Primuth was that an employee can carry on his own trade or business without
19851 NOTES 1143
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
Circuit, however reversed this ruling2' and held that the studio was the
taxpayer's principal place of business.22 Without disturbing the Tax
Court's holding that the taxpayer's trade or business was that of an em-
ployee, the Second Circuit found that in rare situations the employee's
principal place of business may differ from his employer's location.23
Drucker was such a rare situation because the Opera conditioned employ-
ment on musician preparedness. The place of practice was immaterial if
the musician was prepared, and in this case most of the taxpayer's prepara-
tion occurred at home. 24
Other cases have interpreted the "meeting or dealing" requirement of
section 280A(c)(1)(B). In Cousino v. Commissioner25 a teacher claimed a
home office deduction because he used a portion of his mobile home to
grade students' papers and to speak with parents on the telephone. The
Tax Court held that the taxpayer's students did not use his home office to
deal with petitioner merely because he graded their papers at this office.
The court also held that telephoning parents from the office did not consti-
tute client use of the office within the meaning of section 280A(c)(1)(B). 26
A little over a year after its decision in Cousino, however, the Tax Court
allowed a section 280A(c)(1)(B) deduction on facts similar to those in
Cousino. In Green v. Commissioner27 the taxpayer was an account execu-
tive managing seven condominiums for a real estate development corpora-
regard for any compensation received from a particular employer. 79 T.C. at 624 (Korner,
J., dissenting); see Primuth, 54 T.C. at 378.
20. 79 T.C. at 615. Judge Wilbur, dissenting, argued that the focal point should not
always be the place where the "goods" are delivered and paid for. "Rather, it is where [the
taxpayer] continually and regularly devotes his time and effort." 79 T.C. at 615-16. Under
that interpretation, however, the principal place of business requirement would apparently
duplicate the requirement of § 280A(c)(1) that the taxpayer use the home office for business
purposes on a regular basis. Since Drucker's circumstances were not part of the problem at
which § 280A was aimed, his claiming the deduction should not be drawn into any judicial
interpretation of that section. These arguments foreshadowed the Second Circuit's opinion.
See also Note, The Deduction ofHome Office Expenses, supra note 5 (further analysis of Tax
Court's decision in Drucker).
21. Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. Id. at 69.
23. Id.
24. Id The Second Circuit also reasoned that its holding accorded with the legislative
history of § 280A, because that section was not aimed at taxpayers such as Drucker.
Although the Tax Court's use of the phrase "condition of employment" appeared incidental,
the Second Circuit adopted the phrase as a major basis of its holding. The phrase does not
appear in § 280A, but it did emerge in Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52 (applying I.R.C.
§ 162 to home office deductions before enactment of § 280A). The Second Circuit presumed
that the meaning of "convenience of his employer" for purposes of § 280A is the same as the
harsh meaning developed in Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977). 715 F.2d at 70.
Under Kowalski, and Treas. Reg. § 1.1 19-1(b)(3) (1964), a requirement for excluding the
value of lodging provided by an employer from gross income is that the employee accept the
lodging as a condition of his employment. 434 U.S. at 91.
25. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 722 (1981), a'd, 679 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1038 (1982).
26. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 723; cf. Chauls v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 234, 236
(1980) (Tax Court did not consider taxpayers' students to be "patients, clients, or customers"
of taxpayers).
27. 78 T.C. 428 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
1144 [Vol. 38
NOTES
tion. His employer provided him with an office, but the taxpayer spent
much of the day elsewhere. As a condition of employment, therefore, the
employer required the taxpayer to accept telephone calls from clients dur-
ing evenings at home. The taxpayer used a room in his home exclusively
as an office. He spent two-and-a-half hours on five evenings a week using
the telephone in his home office, but clients did not visit the taxpayer at his
home office. The Tax Court held that the clients' calls satisfied section
280A(c)(1)(B) and allowed a deduction because the clients dealt with the
taxpayer in the office, even though by telephone. 28 In reviewing the legis-
lative history of section 280A, the court noted Congress's goal of prevent-
ing personal expenses from being deducted as business expenses.29 The
court found no suggestion either in the legislative history of, or in the pro-
posed regulations promulgated under, section 280A 30 that clients must
deal with the taxpayer "in person" to satisfy section 280A(c)(1)(B). 31 The
court reasoned that "the word 'dealing,' used disjunctively, connotes a less
immediate contact such as by telephone call." 32 Seven judges dissented,33
contending that a person who calls the taxpayer on the telephone does not
use the room in which the taxpayer sits and that when Congress wrote
"meeting or dealing with," it envisioned the physical presence in the home
office of persons other than the taxpayer.34 Judge Wilbur pointed out that
anything less defeated Congress's goal of requiring objectively verifiable
criteria.35 Judge Chabot wrote succinctly:
The majority's holding treats the statute as though subparagraph
(B) reads as follows:
(B) as a place of business which is used by the taxpayer in meeting
or dealing with patients, clients, or customers...
One may agree with, or quarrel with, the policy of the majority's
view of the statute, but that is not what the Congress wrote and
enacted. 36
The appeals of these two cases helped to resolve the conflict that they
created. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding in Cousino,37
because the taxpayer could not show that he used his home office for the
convenience of his employer.38 Moreover, the court found no reason or
28. 78 T.C. at 434-35.
29. Id.
30. Proposed Regs., 45 Fed. Reg. 52399, § 1.280A-2(b) (1980), and 48 Fed. Reg. 33320,
§ 280A-2(b) (1983) (final regulations have not yet been adopted).
31. 78 T.C. at 434-35. But see id. at 443 n.8 (suggesting that it would have taken consid-
erable imagination to have anticipated the Tax Court's interpretation of "dealing with"
(Wilbur, J., dissenting)).
32. Id. at 435. In his persuasive concurrence, Judge Sterrett pointed out that a tele-
phone is the lifeline of some businesses. Id. at 437.
33. Judges Scott, Wilbur, and Chabot authored separate dissents.
34. 78 T.C. at 438 (Scott, J., dissenting); id. at 441 (Wilbur, J., dissenting); id at 445
(Chabot, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 442 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 444 (Chabot, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
37. Cousino v. Commissioner, 679 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1982). The Sixth Circuit failed to
note the Tax Court's decision in Green as authority for Cousino's position.
38. Id. at 604.
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authority for the taxpayer's contention that students "used" his home office
without visiting it.39 On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed Green.40 The
court explained that the ordinary understanding of use involves a require-
ment that is not fulfilled when clients merely call on a phone located in the
claimed home office. 4' The Ninth Circuit considered the legislative history
of section 280A, concluding that Congress intended to limit deductions to
situations in which the taxpayer's business use of his home resulted in sub-
stantial expense.42 Finally, the court stated that if the Tax Court's major-
ity interpretation were accepted, the IRS would be faced with an
impossible task of policing home office deductions, because anyone who
accepted business calls at home could claim a deduction for a telephone
room.
4 3
II. FRANKEL V CoMMIssIoNER
The Frankels based their home office deductions on sections
280A(c)(1)(A) and (B). Judge Nims, writing for the majority, first ad-
dressed the Frankels' claim that Mr. Frankel's use of the home office to
handle telephone calls justified their deductions under section
280A(c)(1)(B).4 The court required that the home office be: "(1) exclu-
sively used (2) on a regular basis (3) as a place of business used by [the
taxpayer's] employer's patients, clients, or customers (4) in meeting or
dealing with the taxpayer (5) in the normal course of his trade or business;
(6) and the exclusive use must be for the convenience of his employer. '45
The Commissioner conceded that Mr. Frankel's use was exclusively for
business and on a regular basis.46 After considering the remaining ele-
ments, the court held that Mr. Frankel's use of the home office satisfied all
but one.4
7
The court first considered the issue of whether the political officials and
public figures who called Mr. Frankel at the home office qualified as "cli-
ents or customers" of the Times. The Commissioner argued that "clients
or customers" should refer to ordinary readers and subscribers of the
39. Id at 605.
40. Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 406.
42. Id at 407, referring to H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 5, at 160. The Ninth Circuit
apparently interpreted "incremental" to mean "small" rather than "additional."
43. 707 F.2d at 407. Judge Sterrett replied to this argument in his concurrence, stating
that the taxpayer's burden of proving exclusivity should defeat such abuse. 78 T.C. at 438.
The majority opinion did not address Judge Sterrett's stance.
44. 82 T.C. at 323.
45. Id at 326. Although the court did not cite authority for these criteria, the require-
ments were clearly drawn directly from the statutory language of § 280A(c)(1)(B).
46. Nevertheless, the Tax Court discussed the application of the regular basis require-
ment of § 280A(c)(l) to Mr. Frankel's circumstances. Since Mr. Frankel's conversations on
the telephone with public figures averaged one a night and each discussion sometimes re-
quired several calls to complete, the court concluded that the calls were sufficient to fulfill
the regular basis requirement. Id. at 325. The court stated, however, that the issue had been
conceded. Id. at 325-26.
47. Id. at 323.
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Times. The Commissioner contended that most of the calls to Mr. Frankel
were from fellow employees and that the public figures who did call Mr.
Frankel were not ordinary readers or subscribers. The Tax Court dis-
agreed, as is illustrated by its finding of fact that most of the calls were not
from fellow employees and that the public figures eminently qualified as
Times readers and subscribers because these individuals would not other-
wise know or care what the Times printed.48 Since nothing in the legisla-
tive history of section 280A or the regulations contravened this
interpretation, the court held that the public figures qualified as clients of
the Times for purposes of section 280A(c)(1)(B). 49
The court then concluded that the taxpayer met the "convenience of his
employer" requirement. 50 The court found that Mr. Frankel's job re-
quired his availability twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, and stated
its belief that Congress did not intend taxpayers with such a job to sleep on
an army cot at their employer's office.51 The fact that the Times paid for a
telephone line at Mr. Frankel's house strengthened the conclusion that the
taxpayer conducted these telephone conversations for the convenience of
the Times.52
The issue of whether the home office was "used by" clients in "dealing
with" Mr. Frankel raised the most vigorous argument.53 The court first
cited the legislative history of section 280A as interpreted in Green.54 The
court noted that both the Ninth Circuit in Green55 and the Sixth Circuit in
Cousino56 held that section 280A(c)(1)(B) does not permit a deduction if
patients, clients, or customers do not physically visit the home office. 57
Upon reviewing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Green, the court quoted the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of section 280A as
evincing congressional intent to tie deductions to substantial expense.58
The court stated that the Frankels would prevail if deductibility flowed
solely from a finding of substantial expense, since they bought their resi-
dence because it contained a room for an office and they furnished that
room solely for use as an office.59 The Tax Court, however, agreed with
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the plain language of the statute, con-
ditioning deductibility upon client use of the office and incorporating only
physical contact into use.60 After quoting from Judge Chabot's dissent to
48. Id at 324.
49. Id. at 325.
50. Id. at 326.
51. Id. at 325.
52. Id. at 325-26. The court cited its opinion in Green, 78 T.C. at 434, and the Second
Circuit's in Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69-70, as support for its holding that the home office was
for the convenience of the employer.
53. Id. at 327. The Frankels conceded that clients did not meet Mr. Frankel there.
54. 82 T.C. at 326 (citing Green, 78 T.C. at 431).
55. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
57. 82 T.C. at 327.
58. Id. at 327 (quoting Green, 707 F.2d at 407).
59. 82 T.C. at 328.
60. Id; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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its majority opinion in Green,61 the Tax Court noted that clients could
have also dealt with Mr. Frankel if he had used extensions in the kitchen
or bedroom.62 Overruling the opinion in Green, the Tax Court held that
since the taxpayer's use did not meet the requirements of section
280A(c)(1)(B), no deduction was allowed on that basis.63
Seven judges dissented, five of whom joined in Chief Judge Dawson's
dissent. 6" The chief judge disagreed with the majority's holding that the
phone calls Mr. Frankel received in the home office did not fulfill the re-
quirements of section 280A(c)(1)(B). 65 The dissent stated that the doctrine
of stare decisis required that the court not overrule its holding in Green.66
The dissent then noted that in this case, the facts more persuasively sup-
ported the deduction than did those present in Green.67 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit based its reversal in Green on nothing more than that al-
ready fully considered by the Tax Court.68 Chief Judge Dawson explicitly
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history
of section 280A; the purpose of sections 280A(c)(1)(A) through (C) was to
provide objective criteria for the deduction, not to establish that the tax-
payer had incurred substantial expense. 69 As for the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation of the plain language of the statute, the dissent now criticized the
majority for focusing on "use," while ignoring its interpretation of "deal-
ing with" in Green.70 Even if "used by" were the crucial language, that
requirement was satisfied when the clients initiated the calls. 7 1 Chief Judge
Dawson argued that the Sixth Circuit's affirmance in Cousino afforded
weak support for the majority, because the taxpayer in that case failed to
establish that he used his home office for the convenience of his em-
61. 82 T.C. at 328; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. 82 T.C. at 328. The opinion thereby implied that clients could not have "used" the
home office. As Chief Judge Dawson pointed out in his dissent, the majority conceded that
clients "dealt with" Mr. Frankel. Id. at 333 n.2. Thus, the language crucial to the majority's
holding that phone calls do not suffice is "used by."
63. Id. at 329; see Green, 78 T.C. at 436. The Tax Court did, however, allow the
Frankels a deduction for the home office under § 280A(c)(I)(A) based on Mrs. Frankel's use
of the office as her principal place of business. 82 T.C. at 329. Mrs. Frankel, a freelance
technical writer, used the home office to write a study contracted for by the United States
Comptroller of Currency. The Comptroller did not provide Mrs. Frankel with any work-
space. Although the contract with the Comptroller specified that the study would takethirty-five days to complete, Mrs. Frankel worked on it during most of 1978. The Commis-
sioner conceded that the taxpayer met all of the requirements for the thirty-five-day period
stated in the original contract, but sought to prorate the deduction based on that period. The
Tax Court, in concluding that Mrs. Frankel's business was that of a freelance technical
writer and not that of an employee hired to do piece work, held that the Frankels were
entitled to deduct their home office expenses for the entire year. Id at 330.
64. 82 T.C. at 331. Judges Fay, Goffe, Sterrett, Korner, and Swift joined in the dissent
authored by Chief Judge Dawson. Judge Shields dissented without filing a separate
opinion.
65. Id
66. Id. (Dawson, C.J., dissenting); see Green, 78 T.C. at 428.
67. 82 T.C. at 331.
68. Id. at 332.
69. Id. at 333; cf. supra notes 29-35 & 42 and accompanying text.
70. 82 T.C. at 333; see supra note 62.
71. See 78 T.C. at 435 n.l l. But see id. at 439, 443 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
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ployer.72 Finally, the dissent argued that the Tax Court should follow its
holding in Green and allow the deduction because Mr. Frankel's use met
the six requirements set forth in the majority opinion.73
III. CONCLUSION
Section 280A imposes severe restrictions on the deductibility of home
office expenses. Taxpayers have sought to loosen the limits of the section
since its addition to the Code in 1976. In Green the Tax Court held that
clients who called the taxpayer at his home office used the office to deal
with him, thereby fulfilling the requirements of section 280A(c)(1)(B).
Taxpayers who welcomed that holding will be disappointed by Frankel, in
which the Tax Court, aligning itself with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
overruled its decision in Green by holding that in order to support a deduc-
tion under section 280A(c)(1)(B) the home office must be physically visited
by patients, clients, or customers. Section 280A supports the result in
Frankel. Considering, however, that Mr. Frankel incurred legitimate and
unavoidable business expenses, the result appears inequitable. A better
system would allow deductions to taxpayers like Mr. Frankel, while pre-
serving the congressional goal behind section 280A of tying deductions to
objectively verifiable criteria. Such a system, however, has yet to be
devised.
Carolyn Sortor
72. 82 T.C. at 334; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
73. 82 T.C. at 334; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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